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Abstract: Purpose: The purpose of the study is to investigate whether operating and 
market performance are aligned to CEO compensation and how board governance 
and dividend policy could influence pay–performance link in the capital market of 
Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach: The hand-collected information on 219 
non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan stock exchange (PSX) is acquired over 
the period 2012–2016. Additionally, panel data technique, namely Prais–Winsten 
(PCSE) and 2SLS (robust standard errors) regression are applied to account for the 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and endogeneity issue. Findings: The empiri-
cal results indicate that CEO compensation is positively associated with operating 
performance and market performance. The evidence also provides partial support to 
agency perspective that board independence and optimal board size could positive-
ly, while CEO duality negative moderates the relationship between operating perfor-
mance and CEO compensation. However, none of these mechanisms are proved to 
be effective in aligning market performance to CEO compensation. In fact, dividend 
policy negatively moderates the association between firm performance (operat-
ing and market) and CEO compensation. Thus, contrary to the agency theory’s 
proposition, dividend policy cannot be utilized as a substitute control device in the 
absence of strong corporate governance mechanisms. Practical Implications: In light 
of this empirical evidence, regulatory bodies in Pakistan could improve corporate 
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governance mechanisms as well as CEO compensation structure to ensure remu-
nerative and ethical financial market. Originality/value: This study contributes to the 
academic literature by validating the underexplored pay–performance alignment 
propositions of agency theorists, especially in the reference of Pakistan.
Subjects: Corporate Finance; Leadership; Corporate Governance
Keywords: CEO compensation; optimal board size; board independence; CEO duality; 
 dividend policy
JEL classifications: D53; G02; G30; G35; J33
1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, CEO compensation has gained noteworthy attention. Much of the atten-
tion is largely due to repugnant increase in compensation of executives in term of cash and stock 
bonuses and further fuel by debatable ethical practices. Public perception of CEO compensation is 
evidently unfair, that is why it gains enough attention of academic literature and practitioners (Gray 
& Benson, 2003; Lin, Kuo, & Wang, 2013; Wilmers, 2014). Excessive compensation of CEOs can create 
agency problem as mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Managers or executives may use their 
discretion in many ways for their own advantages (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Mueller (2012) argued 
that CEOs might involve themselves in empire building and they avoid investing in positive NPV pro-
jects. Therefore, organizations failed to distribute enough cash to its shareholders due to lack of in-
vestment opportunities (Jensen, 1986).
Callahan (2004) claimed that executive’s greed for compensation is contributing the cheating 
culture and negatively influencing the society as a whole. Lin et al. (2013) used a term “fat cat prob-
lem” to define the firms with inefficient performance because of highly paid CEOs. The bulk of the 
problem is due to the lack of linkage between firm’s performance and CEO’s compensation. Blinder 
(2009) demonstrated that inefficient compensation plans of executives were one the major issues 
of financial crises in the year 2008. Most of the CEOs were engaged in excessive risk-taking and 
short-term gambles rather than paying attention to company’s long-term objectives for viable 
growth (Fotouh, 2010). Although developed countries are trying to overcome this issue, an emerging 
economy like Pakistan is still facing a huge controversy in resolving agency conflicts.
Recent cases in Pakistan have revealed the excessive compensation of CEOs (Alam, 2014). 
Shareholders showed much vexation toward overly paid CEOs and protested that annual compensa-
tion of CEO is more than the profit declares by the firm. Regulatory bodies of Pakistan are acquainted 
with this discernment but have not yet taken any necessary notice (Subohi, 2013). Researchers pro-
posed several models in the past to mitigate agency conflicts and excessive CEO compensation 
problem. One of the effective strategies proposed by agency theory is to align the CEO’s compensa-
tion with firm performance as it could align the interests of executives with that of shareholders 
(Grossman & Hart, 1992; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). However, the purpose of the study is to validate 
the role of corporate control components which could act as alignment mechanisms.
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) suggest that corporations with stronger corporate govern-
ance have lesser principal–agent problems and pay their executives a reasonable compensation. In 
addition, the firms with lesser agency conflicts are more likely perform efficiently. Therefore, the 
study by Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, and Tan (2007) demonstrates that executives could take advantage 
of less demanding shareholders or weaker board governance to achieve excessive compensation 
packages, especially in the developing countries. This occurrence previously studied by Boyd (1994) 
that CEO compensation in firms with a lower level of board control was not aligned to firm size or 
profitability. Additionally, Goergen, Renneboog, and Correia da Silva (2005) view dividends as substi-
tute control device which can mitigate managerial agency costs in case of weak board governance 
mechanisms.
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In order to testify these propositions empirically in the context of Pakistan, Yahya and Ghazali 
(2016) examined the link between CEO compensation with firm performance along with the moder-
ating effect of dividend policy in the financial sector. Nonetheless, this study provides a more com-
prehensive model by incorporating the moderating effect of board governance (CEO duality, board 
independence, and optimal board size) which phenomenon is still underexplored especially in the 
perspective of the non-financial sector of Pakistan. Additionally, panel data analysis utilized in this 
study could mitigate several behavioral and modeling biases (Hsiao, 2013). It is believed that this 
study will provide compensation committees and regulatory bodies an extensive model to restrict 
agency conflicts through an optimal compensation structure. Consistent with aforementioned dis-
cussion, the objective of this study is to determine whether CEO’s compensation is aligned to firm 
performance in the non-financial sector of Pakistan and the role of board governance (main control 
device) and dividend policy (substitute control device) as alignment mechanisms to pay–perfor-
mance link.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
In order to provide in-depth insight into the pay–performance alignment mechanisms, this study 
has divided the literature review into different strands. Firstly, a wide range of current and prior lit-
erature on the pay–performance link is discussed. Secondly, the role of board governance mecha-
nism and dividend policy as alignment mechanisms is justified with previous theoretical and 
empirical literature review.
2.1. CEO compensation and firm performance
The pay–performance link is thought to be crucial because the separation between management 
and ownership in firms gives rise to agency conflicts in which managers chase self-regard over the 
shareholder value (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Consistent with agency theory, many researchers pro-
pose that efficient compensation design can resolve this problem (Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2008; 
Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Kaplan & Rauh, 2010). Although there is a wide range of literature on the 
pay–performance link but they provide mixed evidence. For instance, by utilizing the sample of 30 US 
restaurant firms, Dalbor, Oak, and Rowe (2010) found evidence relating compensation alignment 
with performance. In the same US industry, Demirer and Yuan (2013) revealed that compensation 
only in the form of bonuses and non-equity positively affects restaurant firm performance. In addi-
tion, Ghosh (2010) employed cross-sectional data to explore the link between firm performance and 
CEO compensation on Indian manufacturing firm for the year 2007. He observed the significant pay 
for performance sensitivity estimates but the magnitude was smaller.
In contrast, many researchers determine evidence that is consistent with “skimming view” or 
managerial power vis-à-vis executive compensation. On that account, Core et al. (1999) employed 
205 publicly traded US firms to reveal a negative association between excessive executive compen-
sation and subsequent market and operating performance. Parallel to this study, on the basis of ex-
ecutive compensation data-sets of 1,441 Standard and Poor’s firms, Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) 
found empirical evidence persistent with cronyism hypothesis. Moreover, they suggest that exces-
sive compensation leads to value destruction and it is an indication of agency conflicts in a firm.
Along the same lines, Malmendier and Tate (2009) coined a term, “superstar CEOs” for those chief 
executives who extract and enjoy the bulk of compensation. In line with managerial power theory, 
they also found underperformance of firm’s market and accounting performance due to these su-
perstar CEOs. Furthermore, over the period from 1998 to 2010, Balafas and Florackis (2014) examine 
the ex-post consequences of CEO compensation for shareholder value with a sample size of 1787 UK 
listed firms. Through panel data regressions, they ascertain the negative relationship of excess CEO 
compensation with future operating performance and short-term subsequent returns of the firm. 
Likewise, Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2016) also found the negative effect of excess CEO compensation 
on future shareholder return by utilizing a sample size of NASDAQ, AMEX, and NYSE firms.
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In the perspective of the capital market of Pakistan, there is inconclusive and lack of literature on 
the pay–performance association. For instance, by computing common effect model on 114 KSE 
listed companies, Shah, Javed and Abbas (2009) found no significant relationship of firm perfor-
mance variables with CEO compensation. Similarly, Anjam (2011) also discovered that listed firms in 
Pakistan have no association with firm performance. However, holding the managerial power theo-
ry, Younas, Mehmood, Ilyas, and Bajwa (2012) revealed the negative association of CEO compensa-
tion with the firm performance by performing fixed effects regression on 151 KSE listed companies. 
Therefore, it can be concluded from previous studies that agency conflicts in Pakistan prevails due to 
the absence of the pay–performance link, back scratching and cronyism. There is only one study by 
Yahya and Ghazali (2015) which revealed the positive association of operating and market perfor-
mance with CEO compensation in the financial sector of Pakistan. However, it is still not clear if the 
non-financial sector of Pakistani capital market has aligned their CEO’s compensation with firm per-
formance. Directors believe that the best measure of firm performance is shareholder return, while 
CEO’s consider accounting-based operating measures more effectual because CEO’s could directly 
influence operating performance rather than stock returns (Donatiello, Larcker, & Tayan, 2016). In 
order to consider both viewpoints, this study has proposed that CEO compensation should be aligned 
with both operating and market performance. Accordingly, following hypotheses are formulated:
H1: There is a positive effect of operating performance on CEO compensation
H2: There is a positive effect of market performance on CEO compensation
2.2. Board governance
Agency theory argued that strong board governance could mitigate the agency conflicts by aligning 
the interests of agents with that of shareholders (Conyon, 1997). Nonetheless, there are explicit 
strong and weak mechanisms which explain the effectiveness of corporate governance. Consistent 
with agency theory, this study has taken into account independent directors and optimal board size 
as strong mechanisms but CEO duality as a weak board governance mechanism (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).
2.2.1. Board independence
Agency theorists have argued that company board should include independent board of directors 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989) because they are free of conflicts of interest and less sensitive to the influ-
ence of corporate insiders (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Moreover, studies have re-
vealed a dynamic role of independent directors in resolving agency conflicts through efficient 
executive pay setting. By utilizing 362 from 2001 to 2004 and 492 from 2005 to 2007 Chinese listed 
firms, Zhu, Tian, and Ma (2009) found that independent board directors generate a stronger associa-
tion between firm performance and executive compensation.
Similarly, Conyon and He (2011) determined that firms with greater independent directors have a 
stronger pay–performance link. By employing 1381 Chinese public listed companies, they also pur-
ported that independent directors can replace the CEO if they perform poorly. A meta-analysis of 
219 US-based studies by van Essen, Otten, and Carberry (2015) suggests that independent directors 
can positively moderate the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance as CEOs 
receive lower compensation in case of powerful board and the pay–performance link would be tight-
er in that case. In the same lines, Chee-Wooi and Chwee-Ming (2010) also suggested that independ-
ent directors strengthen the pay–performance relationship if they are in majority. The aforementioned 
debate derived the argument that independent directors provide effective monitoring role and even-
tually moderate the relationship between performance-related indicators and CEO compensation. 
Consistent with theoretical and empirical available evidence, this study has generated following 
hypotheses:
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H3: Board independence positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation
H4: Board independence positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation
2.2.2. Optimal board size
Jensen (1983) argued that to fulfill the functions of the board, board size is a crucial determinant of 
board effectiveness. Nonetheless, owing to the different perspectives of agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, there is inconsistent evidence regarding the role of board size in mitigating 
agency conflicts. According to agency perspective, large board size may give rise to the problem re-
lated to low firm performance, free riding, inefficient decision-making, and weak monitoring (Fama, 
1980; Ghosh, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). CEOs could easily manipulate the board member if 
they are larger (Jensen, 1993) but the small board can fire the CEO for poor performance and align 
their pay with performance (Yermack, 1995). In tandem to this argument, several studies found that 
large board size could lead to excessive CEO compensation (Ali & Teulon, 2014; Core et al., 1999; 
Mertens & Knop, 2010; Ozkan, 2011; Reddy, Abidin, & You, 2015; Sapp, 2008). Consequently, 
Fahlenbrach (2009) and Ozkan (2007) proposed a negative effect of board size on pay–performance 
sensitivity.
The perspective of resource dependence theory is different than agency theory as the former 
concept supports the inclusion of large board size. Large board size could provide external resources, 
greater knowledge, and more vigorous skills to the organization (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 
1999). Consistent with this theoretical argument, van Essen et al. (2015) found the positive moderat-
ing effect of board size on the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. Prior 
studies have made their claims on the basis of small or large board size but according to researcher’s 
best knowledge, the academic literature has ignored any specific quantitative assessment criteria 
for the estimation of optimal board size. In order to mitigate the inconclusiveness regarding the 
preferred number of board members, this study argued that board size between seven members to 
nine members can be considered as optimal. This assertion is evaluated from the prior study con-
ducted by Petra and Dorata (2008) who proposed that board size beyond nine members is not effec-
tive. Seminal work of Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also argued that board size should 
not exceed 8 or 9 members. Accordingly, this study proposed that neither very small board size (less 
than 7) nor very large board size (more than 9) could effectively monitor CEO opportunistic behavior. 
Therefore, following hypotheses are generated:
H5: Optimal board size positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation
H6: Optimal board size positively moderates the relationship between market performance 
and CEO compensation
2.2.3. CEO duality
It is an indication of weak corporate governance when CEO’s influence over board increases (Core 
et al., 1999; Hallock, 1997). Therefore, agency theorists show disapproval toward CEO duality as 
CEOs gain all the decision-making powers, which can only benefit the specific owners and harm the 
shareholder value in this case (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). In line with this postulation, several 
studies found positive association between CEO duality and CEO compensation (Cyert, Kang, & 
Kumar, 2002; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Jensen, 1993; van Essen et al., 2015; Vemala, Nguyen, 
Nguyen, & Kommasani, 2014) as duality of position provide excessive discretion to CEOs through 
which they influence their pay-setting process. However, there is mixed evidence regarding the ef-
fect of CEO duality on pay–performance link due to dissimilar assertions of agency, managerial 
power, and stewardship theory. Owing to the fact that stewardship theory prefers insiders over out-
siders, Dorata and Petra (2008) revealed the positive moderating effect of CEO duality on the 
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relationship between firm performance and CEO duality. On the other hand, van Essen et al. (2015) 
proposed no significant moderating effect of CEO duality, while Fahlenbrach (2009) found a negative 
effect of CEO duality on pay–performance link. Nevertheless, due to the prevalence of principal–
agent conflicts in the capital market of Pakistan (Alam, 2014; Subohi, 2013), the postulations of this 
study are more inclined toward managerial power and agency theory regarding the role of CEO dual-
ity. It is proposed that CEO duality adversely affect pay–performance link as CEO duality is associ-
ated with empire building and rent extraction. In tandem to aforementioned theoretical and 
empirical discussion, following hypotheses are formulated.
H7: CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between operating performance and 
CEO compensation
H8: CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between market performance and 
CEO compensation
2.3. Dividend policy
Financial theorists assumed that dividend payout is one of the efficient solutions to mitigate agency 
conflicts. A higher level of dividends satisfy the demand of the investors (Michael, 2013) and protect 
minority shareholders’ investments by reducing excessive cash available in the organization (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Higher agency costs exist in a corporation where 
there is a high amount of available free cash flow which further leads to lower shareholder value, 
overinvestment, or empire building by executives. Therefore, cash flow hypothesis suggested that to 
reduce agency costs and free flows, firms should pay dividends (Richardson, 2006). Although agency 
theory argued dividend policy can act as a substitute control device in the absence of strong corpo-
rate governance (Haye, 2014) but there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding the role of dividend 
policy in mitigating agency conflicts. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence by Emerenciana (2012) is 
not consistent with the agency perspective. The author found more rent extraction, more agency 
conflicts and lower pay–performance sensitivity in dividend-paying firms. Yahya and Ghazali (2016) 
reiterate the claims of Emerenciana (2012) and found that dividend policy distorts the link between 
firm performance and CEO compensation. However, this study is interested to validate the agency 
theory and cash flow theory’s proposition in the non-financial sector of Pakistan. Accordingly, it is 
proposed that dividend policy can act as a substitute control mechanisms when the board is not in 
the favor of shareholders. In view of that postulation, following hypotheses are generated:
H9: Dividend policy positively moderates the relationship between operating performance 
and CEO compensation
H10: Dividend policy positively moderates the relationship between market performance and 
CEO compensation
3. Literature on control variables
Several studies relating to the pay–performance alignment or determinants of CEO compensation 
have considered firm size and growth opportunities as control variables. Large firms can enjoy econ-
omies of scale due to the greater variety of capabilities and eventually they pay a higher compensa-
tion to their CEOs. Owing to this reason, many researchers found the positive association between 
firm size and CEO compensation (Abed, Suwaidan, & Slimani, 2014; Conyon, 2014; Gabaix, Landier, & 
Sauvagnat, 2014; Sigler, 2011). In addition, firms with high growth opportunities and operational 
complexity demand high-quality CEOs (Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 2006). Consequently, several 
researchers proved that the firms with higher growth or investment opportunities, pay their CEOs a 
high level of compensation (e.g. Elloumi & Gueyié, 2001; Kim & Suh, 1993; Sloan, 1993; Wang, 
Frostburg, & Providence, 2013). Market share is also viewed as a control variable. Although there is a 
lack of evidence pertaining to the association of market share with CEO compensation (Yahya & 
Ghazali, 2015) but it is proposed that CEO compensation should also be aligned with market share 
as managerial talent can be assessed by their ability to enhance market share in a high competitive 
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market (Ferreira, 2015). Industry and year dummies are also included in the model as control vari-
ables. Industry was coded according to the Stockholm Stock Exchange 10-category classification.
4. Research methodology
4.1. Data and sample size
Sekaran (1992) pointed out that a careful selection of data for analysis is very important part of a 
good research. According to Hair (2007), if the population is small then the whole population should 
be considered in the study. As this study is intended to capture the picture of the entire capital mar-
ket of Pakistan, all companies listed on PSX are considered except financial firms. There are some 
structural and reporting differences between financial and non-financial companies, thus, the inclu-
sion of financial firms could increase the heteroscedasticity issue (Fama & French, 1992). There are 
582 companies listed on PSX with a market capitalization of USD 95 billion from which 151 firms are 
related to financial sector (insurance, banks, leasing, Modarabas, etc.). Accordingly, the rest of 431 
non-financial firms were the focus of the study. However, through data cleaning process, some com-
panies were eliminated from the data due to unavailability or lack of disclosure. Consequently, final 
sample of 219 PSX listed companies were selected for the analysis. For further elaboration, Table 1 
can be viewed.
Additionally, previous studies on CEO compensation in Pakistan have covered the period up to the 
year 2012. Thus, this study has considered the period from 2012 to 2016. This period is selected due 
to the revised Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan in the year 2012. Accordingly, the total 
firm-year observations of the study were 1095 (219 × 5). In addition, data were collected from an-
nual reports of companies. Furthermore, corporate transparency has increased with the advent of 
revised corporate governance code of 2012, which bound the Pakistani listed firms to disclose the 
information regarding CEO compensation and board of directors. Therefore, information regarding 
corporate governance, dividend, firm characteristics, and performance can be extracted from the 
annual report of the firm.
4.2. Measurement of the variables
Measurements of the variables are adopted from the prior related studies. Total salary and benefit 
of CEO are considered to measure CEO compensation but the log of this value is more preferred by 
prior studies to move the skewed data toward linearity and normality (Bachan, 2008; Barnes, 
Harikumar, & Roth, 2006; Bivens & Mishel, 2013). In order to measure operating performance, this 
study has considered ROS/operating margin. Most of the prior studies have considered Return on 
assets (ROA) or Return on equity (ROE) to measure accounting-based operating performance. Very 
few studies have employed operating margin to build its link with CEO compensation (Awang, 
Asghar, & Subari, 2010; Dehning & Stratopoulos, 2002). Employing operating margin (ROS) is more 
appropriate in this sense because executives could have more control over this metric. CEOs believe 
that they should be compensated for their ability enhances revenues and operating efficiency as 
some of the other metrics are beyond their control.
Prior studies have measured market performance with different proxies such as stock market re-
turn, stock price, Tobin’s Q and P/E ratio. Researchers and analysts argued that P/E ratio is a good 
indicator for market performance because it provides future insight for a specific security (Adams & 
Periton, 2007). Tobin’s Q is not considered in this study to assess market performance because it 
could have cause multicollinearity with M/B ratio. Therefore, P/E ratio is employed as a proxy for 
market performance (Leong, Pagani, & Zaima, 2009; Williams & Naumann, 2011). Moreover, most of 
the researchers have measured dividend policy through dividend payout ratio (Al Masum, 2014; 
Hashemijoo, Ardekani, & Younesi, 2012; Okafor, Mgbame, & Chijoke-Mgbame, 2011). Board inde-
pendence is measured by percentage of independent directors on the board. On the other hand, 
optimal board size and CEO duality are assessed as dummy variables.
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Previous literature has suggested many proxies for firm size such as the log of sales, the log of 
assets, the log of market capitalization, and the log of total employees (Dang, Li, & Yang, 2018). This 
study employed log of sales because it also reflects product market competition (De Andres, Azofra, 
& Lopez, 2005; Raheman & Nasr, 2007). In order to assess growth or investment opportunities, many 
studies have considered the market to book value ratio. Although investment opportunity set (IOS) 
is better and advanced proxy but the data for real options is not publically accessible in the reference 
of Pakistan (Alti, 2006; Fich & Shivdasani, 2005). Identifying an adequate measure of market share 
could be difficult but most of the researchers have measured it by comparing a firm’s total sales with 
total sales of industry (Banker, Darrough, Huang, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013; Kaydos, 1998; Khorana & 
Servaes, 2012). Last but not the least, board size is also accounted as control variable as it is the 
second major determinant of CEO compensation after firm size (van Essen et al., 2015). Table 2 
shows the list of variables and their specific measurements utilized in this study.
4.3. Statistical technique and operational model
The nature of the data (unbalanced panel) has precluded the study from utilizing ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. It is the limitation of OLS that it does not account for unobserved hetero-
geneity relating to between- and within-firm effects. Using OLS regression on panel data could in-
flate t-statistics, underestimated standard errors and could produce correlated error terms (Sanders 
& Hambrick, 2007). Due to different individual traits which do not fluctuate over time, panel data 
observations cannot assume to be autonomously distributed (Wooldridge, 2015). For the ease of 
readability and understandability, the regression model is operationalized in Equation 1 along with 
dependent, independent, moderating, and control variables.
 
(1)
CEOit =0 + 1OPit + 2MPit + 3BINDit + 4OPBINDit + 5MPBINDit + 6OBZit
+ 7OPOBZit + 8MPOBZit + 9CEODit + 10OPCEODit
+ 11MPCEODit + 12DPRit + 13OPDPRit
+ 14MPDPRit + 15BSIZEit + 16 SIZEit + 17GOit + 18MSit + it
Table 1. Industrial classification and available sample size
Sector Total companies in sector Available data
Automobile 22 15





Food & Personal care 23 15
Glass & Ceramics 10 8
Leather & Tanneries 5 2
Miscellaneous 22 10
Oil, Gas, and Refinery 17 12
Paper & Board 11 6
Pharmaceuticals 11 8
Power Generation & Distribution 19 8
Sugar and Allied Industries 34 19




Total nonfinancial firms 431 219
Page 9 of 20
Yahya & Ghazali, Cogent Business & Management (2017), 4: 1398124
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2017.1398124
where it is the ith firm at time t, OP is the operating performance, MP is the market performance, 
BIND is the board independence, OPBIND is the interaction of operating performance with board 
independence, MPBIND is the interaction of market performance with board independence, OBZ is 
the optimal board size, OPOBZ is the interaction of operating performance with optimal board size, 
MPOBZ is the interaction of market performance with optimal board size, CEOD is the CEO duality, 
OPCEOD is the interaction of operating performance with CEO duality, MPCEOD is the interaction of 
market performance with CEO duality, DPR is the dividend payout, OPDPR is the interaction of oper-
ating performance with dividend payout, MPDRP is the interaction of market performance with divi-
dend payout, BSIZE is the board size, SIZE is the firm size, GO is the growth opportunities, MS is the 
market share, and ε is the random error term.
5. Results and analysis
5.1. Summary statistics
The descriptive statistics are illustrated in Table 3 including minimum, maximum, mean, and stand-
ard deviation values of all variables from the year 2012 to 2016. It is revealed that the average 
compensation of CEOs in Pakistan is 1.32 million Rupees (USD 0.01 million). Nonetheless, the mini-
mum value shows that some companies have not paid their CEOs any compensation due to the se-
vere deficit. Standard deviation indicates substantially large variation. On the average, operating 
performance is 0.02 and market performance is 20.38. Variation in operating performance indicator 
is lower than market performance metric.
The summary statistics also show that there is a lower level of representation of independent di-
rectors on board (8%) in PSX. Nevertheless, it is an indicator of sound corporate governance practices 
that almost 86% of board size lies within the optimal range. Furthermore, around 26% firms listed 
on PSX are practicing CEO duality. Some firms have paid the dividend from existing cash despite their 
deficit in order to build investor confidence due to which the minimum value of dividend payout is 
negative. Notably, overall payout ratio in the capital market of Pakistan is low as their preference is 
to retain earnings for future investment opportunities. The central tendencies, variability, and 
spreads for control variables are also mentioned in Table 3, respectively.
5.2. Data validity and model specification
There are certain assumptions of regression analysis which should be fulfilled before testing the 
hypotheses empirically. Accordingly, this study has identified the issues of non-normality in some 
variables which were transformed to normality with Box–Cox power transformation. Box and Cox 
(1964) proposed a power transformation tool with the intention of reducing anomalies such as 
Table 2. Measurement of the variables
Variable Measurement Proxy or Ratio
CEO compensation CEO salary and benefits Log of CEO’s salary and benefits
Firm performance Operating performance ROS—Operating margin: Operating profit/Sales
Market performance Price to earnings ratio
Board governance Board independence Percentage of independent directors on the board
Optimal board size Dummy variable: 1 if board members lies within the range of 7–9, 
0 otherwise
CEO duality Dummy variable: 1 if CEO is also chairman, 0 otherwise
Dividend policy Dividend pay-out Total annual dividends per share/Diluted earnings per share
Control variables Firm size Log of sales
Growth opportunities Market to book value: Market capitalization/Book value of equity
Market share Total sales/total sales of industry
Board size The number of directors on the board
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heteroscedasticity, non-normality, and non-additivity. This technique uses an adequate exponent 
(optimal λ) to transform data within the normality curve. After transformation, skewness and kurto-
sis of all variables were aligned within an acceptable range of −2–+ 2 (George & Mallery, 2010).
Outliers were identified through Cook’s distance. Pardoe (2012) purported that the observations 
with a Cook’s distance less than 0.5 are rarely so influential. There were some potential observations 
with the Cook’s distance greater than 0.5 which were removed. Accordingly, the observations were 
reduced from 1095 to 1035. There is also no issue of multicollinearity as correlations between vari-
ables are less than 0.9 (see Table 4), VIF values were less than 10 and tolerance values were greater 
than 0.1 (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Although Durbin–Watson 
statistic demonstrates no issue of serial correlation (D = 1.93), however, Wooldridge test for autocor-
relation indicates the presence of this issue (F = 9.73; p < 0.01). Additionally, modified Wald test for 
GroupWise heteroscedasticity also pointed that responses are not homogenous across the sample 
(χ2 = 1.3e + 06, p < 0.01).
Table 4. Correlation matrix
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
CEO OP MP BIND OPZ CEOD DPR BSIZE SIZE GO
CEO 1
OP 0.238** 1
MP 0.304** −0.054 1
BIND −0.279** −0.135** −0.239** 1
OPZ −0.294** −0.119** −0.151** 0.168** 1
CEOD −0.263** −0.059 −0.206** 0.204** 0.139** 1
DPR −0.273** −0.119** −0.277** 0.150** 0.154** 0.136** 1
BSIZE −0.366** −0.067* −0.146** 0.212** 0.710** 0.243** 0.178** 1
SIZE 0.488** −0.061 0.150** −0.223** −0.252** −0.214** −0.267** −0.278** 1
GO −0.303** −0.075* −0.499** 0.222** 0.176** 0.172** 0.287** 0.162** −0.201** 1
MS 0.550** 0.024 0.259** −0.205** −0.247** −0.193** −0.267** −0.300** 0.747** −0.243**
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Min Max Mean S.D.
CEO compensation 0 72,654.00 1,317.94 4,919.28
Operating performance −64.22 5.21 0.018 1.99
Market performance −1,205 14,060 20.38 428.40
Board independence 0 0.78 0.08 0.13
CEO duality 0 1 0.26 0.44
Optimal board size 0 1 0.86 0.35
Dividend payout −193.55 5.50 0.05 5.87
Board size 6 21 8.06 1.57
Firm size 7.34 20.90 15.32 1.76
Growth opportunities −31.98 2,534.88 5.46 90.02
Market share 0 0.94 0.09 0.14
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In order to account for the issue of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, this study has utilized 
Prais–Winsten panel corrected standard error estimates (PCSE) regression. It should be noted that 
Park’s feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator can also account for these issues but it can 
only be implemented if number of cross sections are less than number of time periods which is not 
the case in this study, therefore, Beck and Katz (1995) argued that PCSE can more effectively estimate 
standard errors in finite sample. A wide range of studies have utilized this technique in the domain of 
corporate governance (Hategan & Curea-Pitorac, 2017; Ntow-Gyamfi, Bokpin, & Gemegah, 2015).
5.3. Hypotheses testing
In order to show differentiation and variation in regression techniques, the results of pooled OLS, 
random effects, fixed effects, and Prais–Winsten (PCSE) are presented in Table 5. It is believed that 
the pooled OLS estimator ignores the panel structure of the data due to which pooled OLS without 
any robustness provides biased estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Lagrange multiplier (LM) test 
further confirms that random effect is more appropriate as compared to pooled OLS (χ2 = 1099.40, 
p < 0.01). However, Hausman test indicates that fixed effect estimator should be preferred over ran-
dom effect in case of this study (χ2 = 81.55, p < 0.01). Owing to the issue of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity, Prais–Winsten (PCSE) regression is utilized which examine error structure that 
does not conform to the classical OLS assumptions (Johnston, 1972). Therefore, it can be argued 
Table 5. Regression results
Note: The numbers are coefficients along with z and t scores in parenthesis, t-values for OLS and fixed effect and z-




Dependent variable = CEO compensation
Pooled OLS Random effect Fixed effect Prais–Winsten (PCSE)
OP 75.70 (−9.01)*** 20.90 (3.14)*** 6.57 (0.94) 40.35 (4.04)***
MP 0.39 (4.55)*** 0.11 (2.22)** 0.06 (1.20) 0.20 (2.70)***
BIND −0.32 (−2.63)*** −0.24 (3.15)** −0.13 (−1.68)* −0.25 (−3.40)***
OPBIND 0.38 (2.22)** 0.03 (0.26) −0.02 (−0.23) 0.01 (0.08)*
MPBIND 0.11 (0.53) 0.23 (2.16)** 0.21 (2.01)** 0.11 (0.78)
OBZ 0.02 (0.04) 0.29 (0.64) 0.56 (1.20) −0.26 (−0.55)
OPOBZ 0.49 (2.87)*** −0.05 (−0.39) −0.12 (−1.080) 0.14 (1.11)**
MPOBZ 0.19 (0.87) 0.08 (0.60) 0.10 (0.750) 0.15 (1.33)
CEOD −0.92 (−2.64)*** −1.02 (−3.60)*** −0.86 (−3.02)*** −0.82 (−2.31)**
OPCEOD −0.38 (−2.31)** −0.16 (−1.62) −0.08 (−0.86) −0.35 (−2.52)**
MPCEOD −0.05 (−0.36) −0.08 (−0.86) −0.05 (−0.61) −0.13 (−1.48)
DPR 0.06 (0.56) 0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (−0.12) −0.06 (−0.39)
OPDPR −0.18 (−0.77) −0.10 (−0.59) 0.02 (0.120) −0.26 (−3.15)***
MPDPR −0.69 (−2.45)** −0.27 (−1.62) −0.21 (−1.30) −0.35 (−1.77)*
BSIZE −57.59 (−5.07)*** −34.12 (−3.45)*** −24.29 (−2.28)** −45.97 (−4.06)***
SIZE 0.02 (5.33)*** 0.04 (5.29)*** 0.08 (7.25)*** 0.02 (5.16)***
GO −0.25 (−2.25)** −0.20 (−2.48)** −0.13 (−1.58) −0.17 (−1.51)**
MS 11.88 (6.95)*** 4.95 (1.75)* −20.39 (−4.22)*** 12.60 (7.80)***
Year Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included
Constant −62.24 (−7.04)*** −11.33 (−1.61) 6.35 (0.84) −29.92 (−3.02)***
R2 0.462 0.410 0.103 0.490
N 1035 1035 1035 1035
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that Prais–Winsten (PCSE) regression could provide more precise estimates as compared to pooled 
OLS, random effect, and fixed effect estimators.
Prais–Winsten (PCSE) regression results revealed that there is a positive and a significant effect of 
operating performance (β = 40.35, p < 0.01) and market performance (β = 0.20, p < 0.01) on CEO 
compensation due to which the study accepts H1 and H2. On the other hand, the presence of inde-
pendent directors on the board is negatively associated with CEO compensation (β = –0.25, p < 0.01). 
It is also purported that board independence positively moderates the relationship between operat-
ing performance and CEO compensation (β = 0.01, p < 0.1) but the proposition does not hold true in 
the case of market performance (β = 0.11, p > 0.1) resulting in the acceptance of H3 but the rejection 
of H4. Although fixed and random effect estimators evaluated that board independence strength-
ens the association between market performance and CEO compensation but the estimates of 
Prais–Winsten (PCSE) regression are considered more reliable in this study.
The results also asserted that there is no direct significant effect of optimal board size on CEO 
compensation (β = –0.26, p > 0.1), however, H5 is accepted due to the significant moderating effect 
of optimal board size on the relationship between operating performance and CEO compensation 
(β = 0.14, p < 0.05). Nevertheless, optimal board size shows no significant moderating effect on the 
relationship between market performance and CEO compensation (β = 0.15, p > 0.1) due to which H6 
is rejected. CEO duality is negatively associated with CEO compensation (β = –0.82, p < 0.05) which is 
not consistent with agency perspective but as expected, it negatively moderates the relationship 
between operating performance and CEO compensation (β = –0.35, p < 0.05) which leads to accept-
ance of H7. CEO duality has also a negative moderating effect on the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation but the p-value is insignificant (β = –0.13, p > 0.1) and there-
fore, the study fails to accept H8.
The regression results also revealed no significant association of dividend policy with CEO com-
pensation (β = –0.06, p > 0.1). Nevertheless, contrary to the substitute control proposition, results 
suggest that dividend payout negatively moderates the relationship between operating perfor-
mance and CEO compensation (β = –0.26, p < 0.01) resulting in rejection of H9. Similar evidence is 
purported in the context of market performance (β = –0.35, p < 0.1), thus, H10 cannot be accepted. 
In the scenario of control variables, board size (β = –45.97, p < 0.01) and growth opportunities 
(β = –0.17, p < 0.05) are negatively associated, while firm size (β = 0.02, p < 0.01) and market share 
(β = 12.60, p < 0.01) are positively associated with CEO compensation. The goodness of fit for Prais–
Winsten (PCSE) regression is highest (R2 = 0.49), while fixed effect estimates reflect only 10% varia-
tion in CEO compensation model.
5.3.1. Sensitivity analysis
Some studies identified that the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation is 
subject to endogeneity issues and simultaneous bias (Lilling, 2006; Raithatha & Komera, 2016). In 
the presence of simultaneity or endogeneity, the estimates of OLS are inconsistent and biased 
(Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010). One of the popular estimators to reduce the issue of endogeneity is 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) as it has the tendency to generate consistent parameter estimates 
(Byrne, 2001). Table 6 shows three models estimated with 2SLS (robust standard errors) regression. 
Operating and market performance variables are considered as endogenous variables and their 
lagged values are utilized as instrumental variables as suggested by Reed (2015). Angrist and 
Krueger (2001) argued that researchers should rely on fewer instrumental variables because the 
bias of 2SLS is close to zero if the number of instruments are equal to the number of endogenous 
factors. It is confirmed that instruments are not weak as minimum eigenvalues were higher than the 
2SLS size of the nominal 5% Wald test (Stock & Yogo, 2005).
The first model includes only direct effect of firm performance, board governance, and dividend 
payout on CEO compensation. Interaction terms are added in the second model and control varia-
bles with all other variables are incorporated in the third model. The estimates of the third model can 
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be considered more reliable as the variables explain almost 43% variation in CEO compensation. 
There are slight differences in the results of 2SLS regression and Prais–Winsten (PCSE) regression. In 
2SLS regression, the effect of dividend payout in CEO compensation has become positive and signifi-
cant (β = 0.34, p < 0.05) which is negative and insignificant in Prais–Winsten (PCSE) regression. In 
addition, growth opportunities show no significant association with CEO compensation (β = −0.05, 
p > 0.1). Sargan test confirms that there is no issue of over-identification (χ2 = 116.08, p > 0.1).
5.4. Discussion
This paper has addressed the principal–agent issues arise from inefficient CEO compensation struc-
tures. Agency theory argued that agency conflicts could be mitigated if CEO’s compensation will be 
aligned to firm performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In reference to this argument, it is found 
that CEO’s compensation in the capital market of Pakistan is aligned to both operating and market 
performance. The results are in line with the findings of Yahya and Ghazali (2015), however, other 
studies in the perspective of Pakistan have either found no significant association (Anjam, 2011; 
Lone, Hasan, & Afzal, 2015; Shah et al., 2009) or negative association between firm performance and 
CEO compensation (Usman, Akhter, & Akhtar, 2015; Younas et al., 2012). The substantial difference 
in results is due to their utilization of panel data prior to the implementation of revised Code of 
Corporate Governance introduced in year 2012. Yahya and Ghazali (2015) purported that this revised 
Code has improved the corporate governance practices in the capital market of Pakistan.
Table 6. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis





OP 101.38 (6.75)*** 119.94 (7.32)*** 120.43 (8.13)***
MP 0.83 (6.1)*** 1.01 (5.13)*** 0.83 (3.68)***
BIND −0.36 (−2.43)** −0.39 (−2.43)** −0.10 (−0.73)**
OBZ −2.35 (−4.05)*** −2.44 (−3.23)*** 1.31 (1.54)
CEOD −1.47 (−3.25)*** −1.91 (−4.28)*** −0.93 (−2.33)**
DPR −0.27 (−2.43)** 0.09 (0.55) 0.34 (2.17)**
OPBIND 0.68 (2.88)*** 0.43 (2.06)**
MPBIND −0.11 (−0.40) −0.07 (−0.29)
OPOBZ 0.66 (2.62)*** 0.44 (1.94)**
MPOBZ −0.04 (−0.12) −0.27 (−0.90)
OPCEOD −1.02 (−4.81)*** −0.63 (−3.32)***
MPCEOD −0.24 (−1.20) −0.11 (−0.60)
OPDPR −0.73 (−2.27)** −0.55 (−1.93)**





Year Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included
Constant −76.64 (−5.09)*** −98.37 (−5.81)*** −112.02 (−7.17)***
R2 0.22 0.25 0.43
Eigenvalue 200.52 128.08 80.40
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It is a good indicator that CEO’s compensation in Pakistan is also aligned to market performance 
as accounting-based measures can be manipulated by managers (Ball, 2006; Rayburn, 1986). 
Aligning market performance with CEO compensation could testify the postulation of optimal con-
tracting in a competitive market for managerial talent (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). Agency theorists 
also argued that board should be comprised of independent directors to ensure superior control and 
monitoring over agents (Fama & Jensen, 1983), to weaken the CEO’s bargaining power and to ab-
stain them from rent extraction (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). Consistent with this agency perspec-
tive, the results revealed that independent directors desist CEOs to withdraw a high level of 
compensation (Core et al., 1999; Fallatah, 2015). Additionally, the evidence regarding the role of 
board independent in pay–performance alignment is consistent with the proposition of van Essen 
et al. (2015). The results show that independent directors in Pakistan have the capability to align 
CEO’s compensation with the operating performance but their role as an alignment mechanism to 
market performance and CEO compensation seems ineffective. There is a possibility that the discre-
tion and empowerment of independent directors could be enhanced with their greater representa-
tion on board as a previous study by Chee-Wooi and Chwee-Ming (2010) purported that 
pay–performance link can be reinforced by the independent directors if they are more than 50%.
The results also purported that optimal board size cannot directly influence CEO compensation 
but it could strengthen the relationship between operating performance and CEO compensation. 
Although there is no prior study which has employed optimal board size to ensure the variation in 
CEO compensation but the evidence can be partially compared with the meta-analysis of van Essen 
et al. (2015) who also proposed positive moderating effect of board size on the relationship between 
firm performance and CEO compensation. The optimal level of board size formulated from the piv-
otal work of Petra and Dorata (2008), Jensen (1993), and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) can influence the 
relationship between operating performance and CEO compensation but it cannot influence the 
association between market performance and CEO compensation.
In the scenario of CEO duality, the results are also not consistent with agency theory. Agency theo-
rists proposed that duality of positions represent ineffective board monitoring over managers and 
eventually leads to CEO entrenchment (Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, & Lee, 2009) and higher inherent risk 
(Dickins, 2010). However, this study found that CEO compensation decreases with the increase in CEO 
duality but it cannot be claimed that CEOs in Pakistan are stewards due to previous rent extraction and 
overcompensation cases (Alam, 2014; Subohi, 2013). This proposition can also be confirmed by the 
empirical evidence of this study that CEO duality could distort the link between operating performance 
and CEO compensation. This evidence is consistent with the study of Fahlenbrach (2009) who revealed 
that CEO duality negatively influences pay–performance sensitivity which eventually leads to agency 
conflicts. Nonetheless, in line with the postulation of van Essen et al. (2015), it is evaluated that CEO 
duality cannot moderates the relationship between market performance and CEO compensation.
Although agency theory proposed that dividend policy can act as a substitute control device in the 
absence of strong corporate governance mechanisms (Haye, 2014) but this notion is not widely tested 
empirically. The results of 2SLS regression posited that dividend-paying firms also pay a higher com-
pensation to their CEOs. However, contrary to the agency perspective, it cannot strengthen the rela-
tionship between firm performance and CEO compensation. In fact, dividend policy in Pakistan weakens 
or distorts the link between firm performance (operating and market) and CEO compensation. The evi-
dence is consistent with Yahya and Ghazali (2016) and Emerenciana (2012) that dividend-paying firms 
have the lower level of pay–performance association and the higher level of agency conflicts.
As per as control variables are concerned, board size has a negative effect on CEO compensation 
which is congruent with resource dependence view rather than agency theory, i.e. larger board can 
also effectively protect shareholders’ interests and eventually restrict managerial opportunistic be-
havior (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). As expected, positive association between firm size and CEO compen-
sation revealed that large firms pay their CEOs a higher level of compensation. This finding is consistent 
with many regional and international studies (see Gayle, Golan, & Miller, 2015; Lone et al., 2015; 
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Shah et al., 2009; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Usman et al., 2015; van Essen et al., 2015; 
Yahya & Ghazali, 2015). On the other hand, Prais–Winsten (PCSE) regression suggests that firms with 
greater growth opportunities pay their CEOs a lower level of compensation, while 2SLS regression re-
vealed no association of growth opportunities with CEO compensation. Owing to the simultaneity is-
sue, the estimates of 2SLS regression can be considered more reliable. Last but not the least, the 
results found that CEO compensation in Pakistan is also aligned to market share. Executives’ talent 
can be assessed by their ability to enhance market share through cost-effective strategies, thus, 
aligning CEO’s compensation with market share could help an organization to survive in a competitive 
market environment (Jung & Subramanian, 2017; Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2008).
6. Conclusion
This study investigates whether CEO’s compensation is aligned with operating and market perfor-
mance and how board governance and dividend policy affect the pay–performance link in the non-
financial sector of Pakistan. Empirical evidence indicates that both operating and market performance 
are positively associated with CEO compensation which is congruent with the pay–performance 
alignment proposition of agency theory. However, mixed evidence is purported regarding the role of 
board governance and dividend policy as alignment mechanisms to firm performance and CEO com-
pensation. In this scenario, findings are partially supported by agency perspective that board inde-
pendence and optimal board size positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation, while CEO duality distorts this association. However, none of 
these mechanisms have a significant influence over the relationship between market performance 
and CEO compensation.
Contrary to the postulation of agency theory, this study argues that dividend policy cannot act as 
a substitute control device when corporate governance mechanisms are not strong, especially in the 
context of Pakistani capital market. Pertaining to the effect of control variables on CEO compensa-
tion, it is purported that board size has negative while firm size and market share have a positive 
association with CEO compensation. Nonetheless, there is no statistically significant evidence that 
growth firms pay their CEOs more (less) compensation. Large firms with greater market share have 
the capability to pay their CEOs a higher level of compensation. Additionally, consistent with re-
source dependence theory, large board restricts CEOs from rent extraction.
This study contributes to the new and existing body of knowledge, especially in the reference of 
pay–performance alignment. Firstly, only a handful of academic literature has discussed the align-
ment of both operating and market performance with CEO compensation. Especially in the perspec-
tive of Pakistan, only Yahya and Ghazali (2015) have incorporated both performance indicators in 
their study. Most of the studies have relied only on accounting-based measures while building their 
link with managerial compensation which can be manipulated by managers. Secondly, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence regarding the moderating role of board governance (main control mecha-
nism) and dividend policy (substitute control device) on the relationship between firm performance 
and CEO compensation.
According to researchers’ best knowledge, there is no prior study which has validated the effect of 
these moderators with both operating and market performance metrics. Thirdly, Yahya and Ghazali 
(2016) evaluated the effect of different performance indicators on CEO compensation along with the 
moderating role of dividend policy in the financial sector of Pakistan. Nonetheless, they have utilized 
OLS regression which is a less effective technique in case of panel data. Prais–Winsten (PCSE) and 
2SLS regression employed in this study provide more robust evidence in this reference of the non-fi-
nancial sector of Pakistan. Most of the prior studies in the context of Pakistan also ignored the simul-
taneity or endogeneity issue while analyzing the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
compensation which is accounted in this study. Fourthly, the study has empirically tested the under-
explored propositions of agency theory in the capital market of Pakistan and formulated a quantita-
tive proxy for assessing optimal level of board size with the support of prior academic literature. It is 
expected that the ambiguity associated with the optimal board size will be mitigated in future. The 
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findings of the study could help regulatory bodies of Pakistan to design better CEO compensation 
structure and to improve corporate governance mechanisms for the prosperity of capital market.
7. Limitations and future recommendations
Owing to the lack of disclosure and transparency in the capital market of Pakistan, this study was not 
able to include all types of CEO’s socio-psychological characteristics and board attributes (e.g. CEO 
tenure, CEO age, CEO education, board financial expertise, board activity, etc.). Acquiring this data is 
very difficult because it is not available publicly as a secondary source. Therefore, this study exam-
ined relationships for which data was publically available in annual reports of the companies.
Future research is required to offer a further in-depth body of knowledge into the determinants of 
CEO compensation along with various other moderators in the context of Pakistan. In addition, the 
study can be further explored to other Asian countries to reveal the applicability of the current mod-
el on other capital markets. Furthermore, the sector-wise analysis is also possible within the refer-
ence of Pakistan. The current study investigates only specific performance measures with CEO 
compensation. The study could become more valuable if researchers will test the model with some 
other accounting and marketing-based performance measures (especially, Economic Value Added 
(EVA) and Tobin’s Q).
In addition, some other moderators should also be tested in this context to ensure their role in 
aligning pay–performance link as this study does not find any effective alignment mechanism be-
tween market performance and CEO compensation. Studies can also explore the role of different 
ownership structures and audit committee characteristics as moderating variables in the proposed 
model. The study has also not considered the segmented market capitalization group of large cap, 
medium cap, and small cap companies. Therefore, future researchers should continue research in 
this area by analyzing these groups distinctly.
Funding







1  Othman Yeop Abdullah (OYA) Graduate School of Business, 
Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok, Malaysia.
Citation information
Cite this article as: Effectiveness of board governance 
and dividend policy as alignment mechanisms to 
firm performance and CEO compensation, Farzan 
Yahya & Zahiruddin B. Ghazali, Cogent Business & 
Management (2017), 4: 1398124.
References
Abed, S., Suwaidan, M., & Slimani, S. (2014). The determinants 
of chief executive officer compensation in Jordanian 
industrial corporations. International Journal of Economics 
and Finance, 6(12), 110–118.
Adams, S., & Periton, P. (2007). CIMA official learning system 
fundamentals of business economics. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier.
Al Masum, A. (2014). Dividend policy and its impact on stock 
price-A study on commercial banks listed in Dhaka stock 
exchange. Global Disclosure of Economics and Business, 
3(1), 09–17.
Alam, K. (2014). The curious case of a bank CEO’s salary. The 
Express Tribune. Retrieved November 28, 2014, from 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/672546/
takeaway-the-curious-case-of-a-bank-ceos-salary/
Ali, C. B., & Teulon, F. (2014). CEO monitoring and board 
effectiveness: Resolving CEO compensation issue (No. 
2014-045). Paris: IPAG Business School.
Alti, A. (2006). How persistent is the impact of market timing 
on capital structure? The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1681–
1710. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00886.x
Angrist, J., & Krueger, A. B. (2001). Instrumental variables and 
the search for identification: From supply and demand to 
natural experiments (No. w8456). Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anjam, Z. (2011). Board structure and CEO compensation in 
Pakistan (Master’s thesis). Blekinge Institute of 
Technology, Karlskrona.
Awang, A. B., Asghar, A. R. S., & Subari, K. A. (2010). Study of 
distinctive capabilities and entrepreneurial orientation on 
return on sales among small and medium agro-based 
enterprises (SMAEs) in Malaysia. International Business 
Research, 3(2), 34–48.
Bachan, R. (2008). On the determinants of pay of CEOs in UK 
public sector higher education institutions (Discussion 
paper series No. 3858). Bonn: Institute for the Study of 
Labor (IZA).
Balafas, N., & Florackis, C. (2014). CEO compensation and 
future shareholder returns: Evidence from the London 
stock exchange. Journal of Empirical Finance, 27, 97–115. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2013.10.011
Ball, R. (2006). International financial reporting standards 
(IFRS): Pros and cons for investors. Accounting and 
Business Research, 36(sup1), 5–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2006.9730040
Banker, R. D., Darrough, M. N., Huang, R., & Plehn-Dujowich, J. 
M. (2013). The relation between CEO compensation and 
past performance. The Accounting Review, 88(1), 1–30. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50274
Barnes, W., Harikumar, T., & Roth, G. (2006). Determinants of 
CEO cash compensation in small, young, fast growing 
Page 17 of 20
Yahya & Ghazali, Cogent Business & Management (2017), 4: 1398124
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2017.1398124
firms. Journal of Business and Economics Research, 4(2), 
19–28.
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with 
time-series cross-section data. American Political Science 
Review, 89(03), 634–647. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2082979
Bivens, J., & Mishel, L. (2013). The pay of corporate executives 
and financial professionals as evidence of rents in top 1 
percent incomes. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 
57–78. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.27.3.57
Bizjak, J. M., Lemmon, M. L., & Naveen, L. (2008). Does the use 
of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient 
compensation? Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2), 
152–168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007
Blinder, A. S. (2009). Crazy compensation and the crisis. Wall 
Street Journal. Retrieved December 15, 2014, from http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB124346974150760597
Box, G. E. P., & Cox, D. R. (1964). An analysis of transformations. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 26, 
211–252.
Boyd, B. K. (1994). Board control and CEO compensation. 
Strategic Management Journal, 15(5), 335–344. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)1097-0266
Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K. (2006). CEO compensation, 
director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence 
of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 403–423. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.005
Bullock, J. G., Green, D. P., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Yes, but what’s the 
mechanism? (don’t expect an easy answer). Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 98(4), 550–558. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018933
Byrne, B. M. (2001). Structural equation modeling: Perspectives 
on the present and the future. International Journal of 
Testing, 1(3–4), 327–334. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15305058.2001.9669479
Callahan, D. (2004). The cheating culture: Why more Americans 
are doing wrong to get ahead. Orlando, Fl: Hardcourt 
Books.
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics: 
Methods and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811241
Chalmers, K., Koh, P. S., & Stapledon, G. (2006). The 
determinants of CEO compensation: Rent extraction or 
labour demand? The British Accounting Review, 38(3), 
259–275. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2006.01.003
Chee-Wooi, H., & Chwee-Ming, T. (2010). The monitoring role of 
independent directors in CEO pay–performance 
relationship: The case of Malaysian government linked 
companies. Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging 
Market Economies, 3(2), 245–259. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17520843.2010.498136
Conyon, M. J. (1997). Corporate governance and executive 
compensation. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 15(4), 493–509. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01032-6
Conyon, M. J. (2014). Executive compensation and board 
governance in US firms. The Economic Journal, 124(574), 
F60–F89. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12120
Conyon, M., & He, L. (2011). Executive compensation and 
corporate governance in China. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 17(4), 1158–1175. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006
Cooper, M., Gulen, H., & Rau, P. R. (2016). Performance for pay? 
The relation between CEO incentive compensation and 
future stock price performance (SSRN Working Paper 
Series). doi:10.2139/ssrn.1572085
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate 
governance, chief executive officer compensation, and 
firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 
371–406. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0304-405X(98)00058-0
Cyert, R. M., Kang, S. H., & Kumar, P. (2002). Corporate 
governance, takeovers, and top management 
compensation: Theory and evidence. Management Science, 
48(4), 453–469. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.4.453.205
Dalbor, M., Oak, S., & Rowe, T. (2010). How closely is CEO 
compensation tied to performance? An examination of 
the US restaurant industry. The Journal of Hospitality 
Financial Management, 18(2), 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10913211.2010.10653891
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). 
Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership 
structure, and financial performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 19, 269–290. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)1097-0266
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). 
Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-
analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674–
686. https://doi.org/10.2307/256988
Dang, C., Li, Z. F., & Yang, C. (2018). Measuring firm size in 
empirical corporate finance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
86, 159–176.
Dehning, B., & Stratopoulos, T. (2002). DuPont analysis of an 
IT-enabled competitive advantage. International Journal 
of Accounting Information Systems, 3(3), 165–176. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1467-0895(02)00032-5
De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate boards in 
OECD countries: Size, composition, functioning and 
effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13(2), 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1111/
corg.2005.13.issue-2
Demirer, I., & Yuan, J. J. (2013). Executive compensation 
structure and firm performance in the US restaurant 
industry: An agency theory approach. Journal of 
Foodservice Business Research, 16(5), 421–438. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15378020.2013.850374
Dickins, D. (2010). CEO and COB duality: Does it matter. 
Internal Auditing, 25(4), 35–38.
Donatiello, N., Larcker, D. F., & Tayan, B. (2016). CEO pay, 
performance, and value sharing. Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: 
Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance 
No. CGRP-53. Retrieved SSRN from https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2741774
Dorata, N. T., & Petra, S. T. (2008). CEO duality and 
compensation in the market for corporate control. 
Managerial Finance, 34(5), 342–353. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/03074350810866216
Elloumi, F., & Gueyié, J. P. (2001). CEO compensation, IOS and 
the role of corporate governance. Corporate Governance, 
1(2), 23–33. https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000005487
Emerenciana, B. (2012). CEO compensation: Dividends and 
pay-performance sensitivity (Unpublished doctoral thesis). 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherland.
Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Shareholder rights, boards and CEO 
compensation. Review of Finance, 13, 81–113. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn011
Fallatah, Y. (2015). CEO compensation, firm performance and 
corporate governance, an empirical investigation of Saudi 
Arabian companies. Management Research Report, 3(16), 
43–71.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the 
firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–307. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/260866
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1992). The cross-section of 
expected stock returns. the. The Journal of Finance, 47(2), 
427–465. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.
tb04398.x
Page 18 of 20
Yahya & Ghazali, Cogent Business & Management (2017), 4: 1398124
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2017.1398124
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and 
residual claims. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 
327–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/467038
Ferreira, P. (2015). Market competition and executive pay. IZA 
World of Labor.
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2005). The impact of stock-option 
compensation for outside directors on firm value. The 
Journal of Business, 78, 2229–2254. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/jb.2005.78.issue-6
Finkelstein, S., & D'Aveni, R. A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-
edged sword: How boards of directors balance 
entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. 
Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079–1108. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/256667
Fotouh, H. A. (2010). The cosmetic corporate governance - Will 
companies learn lessons from the global financial crisis! 
Retrieved December 21, 2014, from http://ezinearticles.
com/?The- Cosmetic- Corporate- Governance- - - Will- 
Companies- Learn- Lessons- From- the- Global- Financial- 
Crisis!&id=4425027
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010). CEO compensation (No. 
w16585). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w16585
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008). Why has CEO pay increased so 
much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1), 49–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.issue-1
Gabaix, X., Landier, A., & Sauvagnat, J. (2014). CEO pay and 
firm size: An update after the crisis. The Economic Journal, 
124(574), F40–F59. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12084
Gayle, G. L., Golan, L., & Miller, R. A. (2015). Promotion, 
turnover, and compensation in the executive labor 
market. Econometrica, 83(6), 2293–2369. 
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11020
George, D., & Mallery, M. (2010). SPSS for windows step by step: 
A simple guide and reference. Boston, MA: Pearson.
Ghosh, A. (2003). Board structure, executive compensation and 
firm performance in emerging economies: Evidence from 
India.Mumbai: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development 
Research.
Ghosh, S. (2010). Firm performance and CEO pay evidence 
from indian manufacturing. The Journal of 
Entrepreneurship, 19(2), 137–147. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/097135571001900203
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L., & Correia da Silva, L. C. (2005). 
When do German firms change their dividends? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 11(1–2), 375–399. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2003.09.001
Gray, S., & Benson, P. (2003). Determinants of executive 
compensation in small business development centres. 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 13(3), 213–227. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.11
Grinstein, Y., & Hribar, P. (2004). CEO compensation and 
incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 73, 119–143. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.002
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992). An analysis of the 
principal-agent problem. In G. Dionne & S. E. Harrington 
(Eds.), Foundations of Insurance Economics (pp. 302–340). 
Netherlands: Springer. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5
Hair, J. F. (2007). Research methods for business. Chichester: 
Wiley.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). 
Multivariate data analysis (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.
Hallock, K. F. (1997). Reciprocally interlocking boards of 
directors and executive compensation. The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32(3), 331–343. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2331203
Hashemijoo, M., Ardekani, A. M., & Younesi, N. (2012). The 
impact of dividend policy on share price volatility in the 
Malaysian stock market. Journal of Business, 4(1), 
111–129.
Hategan, C. D., & Curea-Pitorac, R. I. (2017). Testing the 
correlations between corporate giving. Performance and 
Company Value. Sustainability, 9(7), 1–20.
Haye, E. (2014). Dividend policy and agency effects: A look at 
financial firms. International Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 6(2), 8–18.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen 
boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. 
American Economic Review, 88, 96–118.
Hsiao, C. (2013). Panel data analysis-advantages and 
challenges (No. 2013-10-14). Xiamen: Wang Yanan 
Institute for Studis in Economics (WISE), Xiamen 
University.
Jensen, C. M., & Meckling, H. W. (1976). Theory of the firm: 
Managerial behavior, agency cost, and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 360–395.
Jensen, M. (1983). Organization theory and methodology. Ac- 
counting Review, 56, 319–338.
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate 
finance and takeovers. American Economic Review Papers 
and Proceedings, 76, 323–329.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, 
and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of 
Finance, 48(3), 831–880. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and 
top-management incentives. Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, 225–264. https://doi.org/10.1086/261677
Johnston, J. (1972). Econometric methods(pp. 259–265, 2nd 
ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Jung, H. W. H., & Subramanian, A. (2017). CEO talent, CEO 
compensation, and product market competition. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 125, 48–71.
Kaplan, S. N., & Rauh, J. (2010). Wall street and main street: 
What contributes to the rise in the highest incomes? 
Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 1004–1050. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp006
Kaydos, W. (1998). Operational performance measurement: 
Increasing total productivity. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420049053
Khorana, A., & Servaes, H. (2012). What drives market share 
in the mutual fund industry? Review of Finance, 16(1), 
81–113. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfr027
Kim, K. H., Al-Shammari, H. A., Kim, B., & Lee, S. H. (2009). CEO 
duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior. 
Journal of Business Research, 62(11), 1173–1180. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2008.10.017
Kim, O., & Suh, Y. (1993). Incentive efficiency of compensation 
based on accounting and market performance. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 16(1–3), 25–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90004-Y
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 
(2000). Agency problems and dividend policies around 
the world. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00199
Leong, K., Pagani, M., & Zaima, J. K. (2009). Portfolio strategies 
using EVA, earnings ratio or book-to-market: Is one best? 
Review of Accounting and Finance, 8(1), 76–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/14757700910934247
Li, D., Moshirian, F., Nguyen, P., & Tan, L. (2007). Corporate 
governance or globalization: What determines CEO 
compensation in China? Research in International 
Business and Finance, 21(1), 32–49. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2005.12.003
Lilling, M. S. (2006). The link between CEO compensation and 
firm performance: Does simultaneity matter? Atlantic 
Economic Journal, 34(1), 101–114. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-006-6132-8
Page 19 of 20
Yahya & Ghazali, Cogent Business & Management (2017), 4: 1398124
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2017.1398124
Lin, D., Kuo, H. C., & Wang, L. H. (2013). Chief executive 
compensation: An empirical study of fat cat CEOs. 
International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 
7(2), 27–42.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for 
improved corporate governance. The business lawyer, 
48(1), 59–77.
Lone, R. R., Hasan, F., & Afzal, M. (2015). Factors effecting CEO 
compensation: Evidence from listed banks in Pakistan. In 
Proceedings of 10th annual London business research 
conference. London: Imperial College.
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2009). Superstar CEOs. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1593–1638. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1593
Mertens, G., & Knop, N. (2010). The impact of ownership and 
board structure on CEO compensation in the Netherlands. 
Obtained via Rotterdam School of Management. Retrieved 
from www.rsm.nl.
Michael, N. B. (2013). Agency conflict and corporate dividend 
policy decisions in Nigeria. Asian Economic and Financial 
Review, 3(8), 1110–1121.
Mueller, D. C. (2012). The Oxford handbook of capitalism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780195391176.001.0001
Ntow-Gyamfi, M., Bokpin, G. A., & Gemegah, A. (2015). 
Corporate governance and transparency: Evidence from 
stock return synchronicity. Journal of Financial Economic 
Policy, 7(2), 157–179. https://doi.org/10.1108/
JFEP-10-2013-0055
Okafor, C. A., Mgbame, C. O., & Chijoke-Mgbame, A. M. (2011). 
Dividend policy and share price volatility in Nigeria. 
Journal of Research in National Development, 9(1), 
202–210.
Ozkan, N. (2007). Do corporate governance mechanisms 
influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation 
of UK companies. Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, 17(5), 349–364. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2006.08.002
Ozkan, N. (2011). CEO compensation and firm performance: An 
empirical investigation of UK panel data. European 
Financial Management, 17(2), 260–285. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.2011.17.issue-2
Pardoe, I. (2012). Applied regression modeling: A business 
approach. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118345054
Petra, S. T., & Dorata, N. T. (2008). Corporate governance and 
chief executive officer compensation. Corporate 
Governance, 8(2), 141–152. https://doi.
org/10.1108/14720700810863779
Raheman, A., & Nasr, M. (2007). Working capital management 
and profitability–case of Pakistani firms. International 
review of business research papers, 3(1), 279–300.
Raithatha, M., & Komera, S. (2016). Executive compensation 
and firm performance: Evidence from Indian firms. IIMB 
Management Review, 28(3), 160–169. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2016.07.002
Rayburn, J. (1986). The association of operating cash flow and 
accruals with security returns. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 24, 112–133. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490732
Reddy, K., Abidin, S., & You, L. (2015). Does corporate 
governance matter in determining CEO compensation in 
the publicly listed companies in New Zealand? An 
empirical investigation. Managerial Finance, 41(3), 
141–152.
Reed, W. R. (2015). On the practice of lagging variables to 
avoid simultaneity. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 77(6), 897–905. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.2015.77.issue-6
Richardson, S. (2006). Over- investment of free cash flow. 
Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2–3), 159–189. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-006-9012-1
Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R., & Jordan, B. D. (2008). Fundamentals 
of corporate finance. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill 
Education.
Sanders, W. G., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). Swinging for the 
fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk 
taking and performance. Academy of Management 
Journal, 50(5), 1055–1078. https://doi.org/10.5465/
AMJ.2007.27156438
Sapp, S. G. (2008). The impact of corporate governance on 
executive compensation. European Financial Management, 
14(4), 710–746. https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.2008.14.issue-4
Sekaran, U. (1992). Research methods for business: A skill-
building approach. New York, NY: John Wiley.
Shah, S. Z. A., Javed, T., & Abbas, M. (2009). Determinants of 
CEO compensation empirical evidence from Pakistani 
listed companies. International Research Journal of 
Finance and Economics, 32, 148–159.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate 
governance. The Journal of Finance, 52, 737–783. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
Sigler, K. J. (2011). CEO compensation and company 
performance. Business and Economics Journal, 31(1), 1–8.
Sloan, R. G. (1993). Accounting earnings and top executive 
compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16(1–3), 
55–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90005-Z
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in 
linear IV regression. In D. W. K. Andrews & J. H. Stock 
(Eds.), Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: 
Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg (pp. 80–108). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614491
Subohi, A. (2013). Corp executives gather fortune, regulators 
look sideways. The Dawn. Retrieved December 16, 2014, 
from http://www.dawn.com/news/1053909
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate 
statistics (5th ed.). Needham Height, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. (2000). How 
much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO 
pay studies. Journal of Management, 26(2), 301–339. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/014920630002600207
Usman, M., Akhter, W., & Akhtar, A. (2015). Role of board and 
firm performance in determination of CEO compensation: 
Evidence from Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan 
Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences, 9(2), 641–657.
van Essen, M., Otten, J., & Carberry, E. J. (2015). Assessing 
managerial power theory: A meta-analytic approach to 
understanding the determinants of CEO compensation. 
Journal of Management, 41(1), 164–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311429378
Vemala, P., Nguyen, L., Nguyen, D., & Kommasani, A. (2014). 
CEO compensation: Does financial crisis matter? 
International Business Research, 7(4), 125–131.
Wang, H. C., Frostburg, C. V., & Providence, Y. L. (2013). 
Determinants of chief executive officer compensation. 
The International Journal of Business and Finance 
Research, 7(4), 29–42.
Williams, P., & Naumann, E. (2011). Customer satisfaction and 
business performance: A firm-level analysis. Journal of 
Services Marketing, 25(1), 20–32. https://doi.
org/10.1108/08876041111107032
Wilmers, R. (2014). Why excessive CEO pay is bad for the 
economy. American Banker. Retrieved December 1, 2016, 
from http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-
excessive-ceo-pay-is-bad-for-the-economy-1066239-1.html
Wooldridge, J. M. (2015). Introductory econometrics: A modern 
approach. Scarborough, ON: Nelson Education.
Yahya, F., & Ghazali, Z. (2015). Beyond the conventional 
mechanisms of CEO compensation: Empirical evidence 
from the financial sector of Pakistan. International Journal 
of Business Research, 15(5), 71–84. 
https://doi.org/10.18374/IJBR-15-5.7
Page 20 of 20
Yahya & Ghazali, Cogent Business & Management (2017), 4: 1398124
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2017.1398124
© 2017 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license.
Yahya, F., & Ghazali, Z. (2016). The moderating role of dividend 
policy in aligning the accounting and market based 
performance measures with CEO compensation. 
International Journal of Management, Accounting and 
Economics, 3(6), 354–366.
Yermack, D. (1995). Do corporations award CEO stock options 
effectively? Journal of Financial Economics, 39(2–3), 237–
269. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00829-4
Younas, Z. I., Mehmood, B., Ilyas, A., & Bajwa, H. A. (2012). 
Corporate governance mechanism and firm performance 
as determinants of CEO compensation: A panel data 
analysis of Pakistani listed companies. Journal of Global 
Economy, 8(4), 307–316.
Zahra, S. H., & Pearce, J. P. (1989). Board of directors and 
corporate financial performance: A review and integrative 
model. Journal of Management, 15, 291–334. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/014920638901500208
Zhu, Y., Tian, G. G., & Ma, S. (2009). Executive compensation, 
board characteristics and firm performance in China: The 
impact of compensation committee. In 22nd Australasian 
finance and banking conference (pp. 1–48). Sydney: Social 
Science Electronic Publishing, Inc.
